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Long ago, in a state far, far away, Roman Catholic Sisters arrived as representatives of 
their Order to tackle basic human needs in that community. Among other things, the Sisters 
organized a charity hospital that, decades later, continues to serve the people of that region. Like 
so many other charitable enterprises, the Sisters hospital became increasingly difficult to 
operate as expenses and expectations grew. At the same time, fewer young women were joining 
the Order but existing members continued to live long and grow ill. They tried an arrangement 
with another charity hospital and eventually decided they needed to consolidate operations and 
eliminate waste. That started an explosion of anger in the community: the people served by the 
Sisters felt cheated and abandoned, and they vehemently opposed the reorganization.  
 
The Sisters had been a fixture in that region for as long as anyone could remember, and 
the Sisters had solicited and been recipients of the community’s charity and other good will. The 
community complained about the loss of this resource and the Sisters’ plan to recapture some of 
their investment to support the needs of their elderly and infirm members. Eventually, the dispute 
reached the ears of the state Attorney General. The Attorney General sued to unwind the 
transaction with the other city hospital and preserve the charity.
1
 As many of these stories end, 
                                                          

 Partner and Chair of the Nonprofit & Religious Institutions Practice Group at Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, 
LLP and resident in Washington, DC.  He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center.  He is a graduate of the Cornell Law School and the University of Scranton.  Between 1987 and 2007, he 
served as the chief legal officer of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Mr. Chopko would like to 
thank his co-panelists, William Marshall and Lloyd Mayer and other participants in the Columbia Law School 
project on February 8, 2013 for their comments and critique.  He especially would like to thank Alex L. Rubenstein, 
associate in the Stradley Ronon litigation department, for his invaluable assistance in bringing this article to the 
finish line. 
1
 As one newspaper described the suit: 
 Florida's attorney general has sued to stop either plan from going forward and asked the court  
 to dissolve the merger that created Intracoastal in 1994. The attorney general wants the court  
 to acknowledge that St. Mary's was built and supported through public donations and that it  
 provides almost half the indigent care in Palm Beach County. It suggests turning St. Mary's  
 into a public hospital and putting it into a trust to be managed by community groups including  
 the Health Care District. 
2 
 
fate took a hand. Did the story end happily ever after? It depends who’s doing the telling. A for-
profit health system offered to buy the hospital from the Sisters, the hospital continued to operate 
under the same name with the new owners, and the Sisters deposited a sum of money from what 
they saw as their return for charity care, for continuing charity in the region.   
 
The point of the story is not how the hospital got to the point of contemplating the sale.  
The point has to do with the rationale used to leverage the intervention of the state Attorney 
General, and ultimately leverage the continuing charitable community action. What the state 
advanced was that the local community had been asked to support the Sisters and had responded 
generously, financially and in kind, over the years, and therefore the local community itself had 
an interest that needed to be protected by the State against the Religious Sisters. The public 
interest was described in terms of geography, and not in the terms of the Sisters’ investment in 
initial equity, decades of tireless and poorly compensated service before the hospital grew, and 
thousands of other acts of kindness in the community. For our purposes the assertion of the 
State’s authority over this religious charitable enterprise on the supposition that the hospital 
served only a narrow community purpose (service), and not a variety of purposes (service + 
public witness, religious expression, source of excess revenue to underwrite other religious 
charity) raises serious questions about how and why government draws lines when it polices 
religious exercise. Can the religious exercise be defined in such a way that it is found to be 
external in the larger community (only) and not (also) internal to the faith community?  Does the 
support of the community for religious charity necessarily trigger blanket state regulatory 
control? 
 
Clearly, religious organizations appeal to members of the community all the time for 
financial and other support. The rationale that, by contributing financial and other resources, 
the community has a residual interest in how the charity itself is organized and operates will, if 
pushed to its maximum reach, undoubtedly fuel disputes for generations.
2
 Although I suspect that 
however these disputes get framed, the solutions are invariably political and practical, there is a 
real issue about the kinds and types of regulation to which religious charity can and should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Stacy Singer, Trial Date Set in Hospital Controversy, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 2001, available at 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-01-19/news/0101190235_1_trial-date-health-care-district-mediator. 
2
  For example, congregations open and close all the time based on community demographics. If the community had 
supported a local church for decades, would the dissenting members of that community have standing to appeal to a 
state regulator to contest a district supervisor or Bishop’s decision to close, consolidate, or remove the congregation 
to another community where members are more numerous?  The rule is that those questions are religious and that 
the former congregants often have no basis on which to contest them in the civil courts unless the civil documents 
give congregants specific rights. Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 867 N.E.2d 300, 309-11 (Mass. 
2007).  But the persistence of this litigation and the resonance between the charitable trust theories advanced by the 





 This essay describes the background, the law, and the practical challenges that result 





THE PATH TO THE CURRENT DAY 
 
 The doctrinal roots of the law that gets applied in this area of public life lie more than a 
century ago. Before 1990, there was a more rigid barrier between the institutions of government 
and religion with respect to both access to public programs and public regulation.  About 20 
years ago, before the law on the federal Establishment Clause changed with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Agostini v. Felton,5 Mitchell v. Helms,6 and Zelmon v. Simmons-
Harris,
7
 I debated the right of religious organizations to participate in public programs as part of 
a larger conference about the role and regulation of religious organizations in public life, 
including access to public funds and spaces and accountability to state regulators.
8
 My opponent, 
the late Rev. Dean M. Kelly, a scholar and raconteur, as well as a zealous defender of the 
separation of religion and government, argued that “with the King’s coin comes the King.” In 
response I argued that such concerns were reasons that religious organizations should not 
participate in programs, but not reasons why they could not.
9
 At that time, it was not certain 
whether religious organizations would necessarily have to forgo regulatory exemptions in order 
to participate in public life, as the price of increased access to public programs. After all, the 
Supreme Court had resisted the imposition of National Labor Relations Board regulation over 
Catholic schools, arguing that Congress could not have intended to entangle the Board and that 
                                                          
3
 There are also serious problems that such regulations could cause especailly for religious charities. As Professor 
Wells explains, charities “provide an opportunity for individual citizens to pursue their own vision of the public 
good outside the bounds of consensus and orthodoxy. In so doing, they free our feelings of compassion and 
fellowship from the requirements of the larger political process.” Catherine Pierce Wells, Charches, Charities and 
Corrective Justice: Making Churches Pay of the Sins of the Their Clergy, 44. B.C. L. REV. 1201, 1208-09 (2003). 
Too much regulation serves to tie that compassion and feeling of fellowship straight back to the political process.  
4
 For more information regarding the above described events, see, e.g., Stacey Singer, State Lawsuit Seeks to Force 
Hospital to Become Public, SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 4, 2001, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-01-
04/news/0101040084_1_two-hospitals-intracoastal-health-systems-st-mary; Stacey Singer, For Nuns, a Tearful 
Farewell to an Era, SUN SENTINEL, June 30, 2001, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-06-
30/news/0106291014_1_nuns-st-mary-nursing-home.  
5
 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
6
 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (Plurality Opinion).  
7
 536 U.S. 639 (2002).  The discussion of the reformation of doctrine is found infra at note XX. 
8
 The Conference was entitled Religion in Public Life: Access, Accommodation, and Accountability, and was held 
at the University of Pennsylvania from May 30 through June 1, 1991. It was chaired by the Hon. Arlin M. Adams 
(Ret.) of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  
9
 My remarks were subsequently published as Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645 (1992). There, I questioned the continued usefulness of the evaluative test proposed by the 
Supreme Court under the Establishment Clause. That test, the Lemon test, is still operative. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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allowing such scrutiny necessarily skirted, if not infringed, barriers erected by the First 
Amendment, because teachers were inextricably bound to the school’s proselytizing mission.10  
 
 What was only dimly perceived at the time, but is now apparent, is that the Supreme 
Court was undertaking the rewriting of the terms of engagement between institutions of 
government and religion, both from the perspective of participation and regulation. The Court 
was gradually moving towards a neutrality-based system for the allocation of benefits and 
burdens (as illustrated by the cases noted above), and away from the separatist rationale that 
walled off religion in both directions. The Court signaled some significant movement in 1990 
when it handed down its decision in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. State Board of Equalization.
11
 
In that case, California subjected Swaggart Ministries to sales tax on the sale of religious articles 
sold on the site of Swaggart’s evangelization and worship services. 12  Swaggart Ministries 
conceded its liability to pay the tax on sales of non-religious goods, and it had a sophisticated 
accounting system to track and allocate sales between religious and non-religious articles.
13
 The 
Court rejected both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause challenges to the imposition 
of sales tax on religious articles. Essentially, the Court decided that the sales tax rules were 
neutral and applied generally, and that in their reach they did not discriminate one way or the 
other with respect to religion.
14
 The Court did not apply its traditional compelling interest 
analysis because the only burdens were (arguably) diminished income and certain administrative 





was no excessive entanglement for Establishment Clause purposes: all articles were taxed and 
there was no need for the state to evaluate which articles were religious and which ones were 
not.
17
 Similarly, there was no Free Exercise right to an exemption from taxation.
18
 Although the 
Court acknowledged there could be such an excessive tax that it would choke off religious 
works, it reserved that question for another day.
19
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  N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979). A century before, in Holy Trinity Church v. United 
States, the court had held that Congress could not have intended to apply the immigration laws to block the call of a 
foreign-born cleric by a domestic Episcopal parish community. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  
11
 See 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
12
 Id. at  382-83. 
13
 Id. at 383. 
14
 See id. at 389-90.  
15
 I use “Religion Clause” to refer to both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.  
16
 Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391-92. 
17
 Id. at 392-97. Ironically, this result turns the broad endorsement of real estate tax exemption in Walz v. Tax 
Commission somewhat on its head. See 397 U.S. 664 (1970). There, the Court found that there was no excessive 
entanglement in a broad exemption because there was no need for the state to decide how to draw lines among 
various uses. Id. at 673-74.  All charitable uses were exempt, religion included. Id. Trying to carve out religion 
would inevitably lead to detailed state surveillance and oversight of religious property, a result which the Court, by 
an eight to one margin, thought unconstitutional. It was “hands-off” religion. 
18
 See Swaggert Ministries, 493 U.S. at 389-90. Similarly, the Walz Court noted that traditionally, exemption from 
taxation was a matter of legislative, not divine, Grace. See 397 U.S. at 676-78. 
19
 Swaggert Ministries, 493 U.S. at 392. For a discussion on the role of extra-judicial factors in Free Exercise Clause 
cases, see generally Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical 
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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 A few months later, the Court rewrote Free Exercise law in Employment Division v. 
Smith.
20
 There, Native American drug counselors attacked the denial of unemployment 
compensation arising from their terminations for drug use as unconstitutional because they had 
been engaged in a religious exercise that involved the consumption of a hallucinogenic drug.
21
 
They committed a crime, and for well over a century, the Court has held that religious conviction 
did not immunize one from a criminal conviction.
22
 The Court’s rationale however was a blanket 
revision of the law on the exercise of a fundamental right. A bare majority held that, if a law is 





 The Court rationalized away prior applications of a compelling interest analysis in other 
cases involving unemployment compensation as involving an individualized assessment of the 
proffered religious rationale.
24
 Likewise, it explained away decisions rejecting state regulation 
over religious choices, such as refusing to apply Wisconsin’s criminal laws against Amish 
parents, by calling those cases “hybrid cases” involving religion and some other protected 
right.
25
 Without some other buttressing right, a religious choice was left with minimal 
protections against a neutral and generally applicable regulation. In my view, Smith, more than 
any other single factor, has opened the door to broader state regulation of religious conduct and 
its limits are not evident at this writing.
26
 One area that the Court majority preserved in Smith 
was religious institutional autonomy from government scrutiny over religious matters, a matter 




 The practical implications of the parallel developments in Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
28
 shifting away from a strict separation of religion and 
government for both benefits and regulation, to greater involvement so long as the government is 
acting neutrally and even-handedly, have not yet been explored by the Court. Anecdotally, 
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 See 494 U.S. 872 (1990).   
21
 Id. at 874. 
22
 The baseline case for this proposition is Reynolds v. United States, where the Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction of a Mormon against a criminal charge of polygamy. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court ruled that allowing 
for religious exceptions to the application of the state’s criminal laws would promote anarchy and disrespect for the 
law. Id. at 166-67. The Constitution protected freedom of belief without restriction, but subjected actions to 
regulation when it was in the public interest. Id. 
23
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. 
24
 Id. at 883-884. 
25
 Id. at 881-82.  
26
 The Court did sustain and better define when a law is not neutral and not generally applicable in Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).   
27
 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-882. The Court recognized, and did not disturb, the Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), line of cases, which prevent the government from ruling on religious disputes. 
See id. at 877 (citing Serbian and other cases).    
28
 After reversing course in 1997 in Agostini and upholding federal remedial education programs, a plurality of the 
Court confirmed that neutrality is its touchstone in Mitchell v. Helms. 530 U.S. 793,  809 (2000).  Justice O’Connor 
withheld the fifth vote from that plurality and some speculate that the replacement of Justice O’Connor with Justice 
Alito assures that neutrality of treatment, more than any other benchmark, will be the rule. 
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though, churches report more litigation filed against them by former employees.
29
 Religious 
organizations report confronting more forms and layers of regulation.
30
 And exemptions are 
harder to come by as government increasingly sees religion as just another political interest.
31
 
Yet in the inferior federal and state courts, despite the diverse approaches and inconsistent tests 
and results, all the courts acknowledge the vitality of institutional religious rights even when they 




 In some ways, the societal interest in equality has resonated with the message of religious 
institutions seeking equal treatment at the hands of the government. Religion, after all, should 
not be defined in two different ways with respect to the two clauses of the First Amendment.
33
   
The touchstone cannot be “equality” for participation in government programs, but “exemption” 
when one is dealing with regulation. At the same time, the insistence that there are neutral, 
secular, and generally applicable norms that override all claims of religious exemption except the 
most narrow sheds a surprising light on the perceived state and status of religious institutions, a 
perception that would have been shocking to those who drafted and ratified the Religion Clauses 




 Less invasive but, from the perspective of religious institutions, every bit as coercive and 
corrosive, is the power of the government to regulate some aspect of institutional life either 
directly by changing the definitions and scope of various exceptions or indirectly by permitting 
litigation privately to affect certain changes. Particular tax exemptions or treatment may turn 
upon the implementation of a mandatory employment policy.
35
 Religious schools may adjust 
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 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cooke v. Tubra, No. 10-559, at 32-34. 
30
 See, e.g., Press Release of Massachusetts Attorney General, “A.G. Coakley Unveils Proposed Amendments to 
Regulations Governing Religious Charities,” (Dec. 29, 2011) available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/2011/ag-proposes-amendments-to-charities-regs.html.   
31
 This is particularly troubling because after Smith, “legislative exemptions are now practically the ‘only available 
vehicle for honoring Free Exercise values’ under the First Amendment.” Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom 
Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 430 
(2007) (quoting DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 108 [2003]).  
32
 For example, many cases decided since Smith have either implicitly or explicitly rejected the argument that Smith 
eroded church autonomy rights.  See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-05 (3d Cir. 2006); E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.* 
(4th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348-50 
(5th Cir.1999); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 656-57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1302-04 (11th Cir.2000); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 
455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
33
 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  
34
 This also seems to fly in the face of the concept of seperation of church and state. As Professor Esbeck once 
explained, “[t]he aim of separation of church and government is for each to give the other sufficient breathing 
space.”  Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 
41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 348 (1984). How is it possible for either side to get that breathing space if they are 
both constantly entangled through generally applicable regulations?  
35
 A Connecticut tax program would have conditioned exemption for hospitals on the provision of reproductive 
services, effectively asking Catholic and Baptist institutions to choose. The proposal was abandoned in the face of 
public outcry on behalf of religious hospitals.  See Mark E. Chopko,  Shaping the Church: Overcoming the Twin 
Challenges of Secularization & Scandal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 136-37 (2004) (discussing growing trend toward 
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curricula to meet state guidelines contingent for funding.
36
 Rising employment-related litigation 
encourages more legalistic employment contracts with terms, concessions, and obligations that 
trend away from the utopian (and perhaps preferred) approach of “do unto others.”37 In such 
circumstances, faith communities find themselves faced with a Hobson’s choice: adjust religious 
exercise to prevailing secular norms or suffer civil penalties or litigation. 
 
 A current example of the dilemma confronting religious entities is the narrowing of the 
definition of “religious employer” for the application of certain healthcare rules. Religious 
entities provide health benefits for their workforce as a matter of course, but attempt do so in 
accord with internal religious principles.
38
 Ten years ago, California and New York (and other 
states) passed laws requiring access to contraceptive drugs and devices as part of employer-
provided health plans.
39
 The laws contain an exceedingly narrow definition of “religious 
employer,” 40  effectively classifying among admittedly religious agencies, defining many as 
“secular” and therefore subject to secular regulation. Applying this definition to religious 
institutions means that, for this regulatory purpose, only a very few will be able to be considered 
“religious” by the government. By definition, the rest are effectively “secular” (non-religious).41 
Paying the employer share, from the perspective of the religious institutions, required the 
religious institutions to make a public statement at odds with their moral views.
42
 Constitutional 
objections to the imposition of the mandate and to the narrow scope of the exemption were 
rejected, and the state laws prevailed.
43
 Although such a narrow regulatory definition is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conditioning tax-exempt status of religious institutions on those institutions’ conformity with public policy/secular 
norms). 
36
 For example, to participate in a state voucher program Cleveland religious schools must adhere to content-based 
curriculum guides that dictate what cannot be taught. Specifically, such schools may not teach “hatred of any group 
or person on the basis of . . . religion.” Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 713  (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(6) (West 2002)). Such interference by the state on religious schools’ curricula 
opens the door to more content-based regulation in exchange for money in the form of school vouchers. 
37
 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. at 343-46 (Brennan, J., concurring) (warning that weakening 
respect for notion of church autonomy ran risk of chilling legitimate expressions of religious exercise). 
38
The Code of Canon Law provides that church employers provide for health and pension and other benefits for the 
workforce. Canons §§ 231-2; 1286. 
39
 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 2004) (discussing 
California statute); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y. 2006) (discussing 
New York statute). 
40
 See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 75; Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 462. 
41
 While the government says that churches are exempt from these rules, the four part test – requiring, besides 
exemption from filing IRS Information Return Form 990, that an entity have as its primary mission “inculcation” of 
religious values (as opposed to service, evangelization, solidarity with the poor, etc.) and that it hire and serve those 
who “share” these values – will necessarily exclude churches depending on how much the government wants to 
define “inculcation” or which “religious values” have to be shared. 
42
In other words, the religious institutions argued that money equals speech. That argument split the intermediate 
appellate bench in the New York Courts in Serio. See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 808 
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). Such an argument might be even stronger now, in light of the Court’s decision 
in Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which had not been decided at the time either Serio or Catholic 
Charities of Sacramento were decided. 
43
 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 73–74; Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 461. 
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subject of widespread litigation as of this writing, a decision validating the narrowed definition 
of “religious employer” will itself open the door to newer and more intrusive rules by defining 
away the constitutional problem. 
 
 The problem we are left to contemplate is line drawing between the demands of the state 




BETWEEN SMITH AND A HARD PLACE 
 
 Religious organizations enjoy broad immunities in the United States, immunities that are 
not experienced by those same faith communities in other parts of the world. For example, in the 
United States, no one interferes with the right of religious citizens to band together and organize 
a house of worship, engage in that worship, and through the fruits of their evangelization, acquire 
real estate, open schools, publish papers or broadcast messages, and build more commodious 
houses of worship as they grow and expand. They need not seek the sanction of the State in order 
to hold themselves out as a religious organization, embrace civil form (such as a corporation or 
charitable trust), and receive exemption from taxation.
44
 Religious organizations are subject to 
state regulation after the fact, and even then only to prevent the perpetration of a fraud or some 




 The constitutional rules assuring those freedoms from prior restraints and permissions 
find expression under the rubric of institutional autonomy. The principle, expressed in Watson v. 
Jones,
46
 is that the secular government is incompetent to assess or adjudicate religious questions, 
and as a consequence should stay out of policing the internal affairs of a religious community.
47
 
The rule of incompetence has two edges. The first and more obvious one is that a congregant’s 
appeal to the civil courts to adjudicate some dispute arising in a religious community is an 
appeal, in the Court’s words, from the “more competent,” that is, expert, adjudicators inside the 
faith community, to the less competent, civil judges.
48
 The second is more nuanced and is rooted 
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 See, e.g., Sarah J. Hastings, Cindarella’s New Dress: A Better Organizational Option for Churches and Other 
Small Nonprofits, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 813, 836-46 (2007) (discussing different organizational forms that churches can 
take). In addition, religious charities are subject to less regulation than secular charities. See Michele Estran Gilman, 
“Charitable Choie” and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 VAND. L. REV. 799, 836-843 (2002).  
45
 Historically, religious action has been subject to the state’s power to regulate such conduct to protect the public 
from fraud. See Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
46
 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
47
 Id. at 727.  
48
 As the Court explained,  
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the   
 ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in   
 reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the  
 law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.  
 Id. at 729. 
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in the civil power to adjudicate certain questions. The Court said that civil courts are 
incompetent, as an exercise of judicial power, to adjudicate questions that depend on religious 
law and principle for resolution.
49
 Over the next century after the announcement of these 
principles, through an approach of deference to the faith community, the Court broadly protected 
the internal affairs of religious bodies from government scrutiny, over questions of property, 
financial integrity, selection of leadership, and other matters. This series of rulings, however, 
also fit within the framework of separation which, from 1947 to the 1990’s, the Court had 
applied in the adjudication of both benefits questions
50
 and regulatory questions.
51
 Even if the 
dispute arose in an area of law on which civil courts have historically exercised authority, such 
as in the construction of testamentary trusts, if the legal question ultimately involved a matter of 
religious law or principle, the instructions to the court were simple: “hands-off.”52 
 
 As they grow and expand, however, these organizations inevitably encounter the modern 
regulatory state. Although the byword will be compliance, there are still exceptions and 
immunities to be sure that regulation does not mask some discriminatory agenda or embed the 
State in deciding the Church’s issues. For example, when they need new facilities to 
accommodate growing congregations, they will be subject to reasonable land-use and zoning 
regulations. But the decisions of land use officials can also be subjected to additional scrutiny 
under a federal law designed to protect religious congregations from land-use regulators anxious 
that any new or expanded religious exercise occur in some other jurisdiction. The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
53
 was passed overwhelmingly on a record that 
showed how land-use decisions, though facially neutral and through rules that are generally 
applicable, have been used to mask prejudice in the community against the inclusion of specific 
houses of worship.
54
 Another example is in the area of tax exemption. Although religious 
institutions are presumptively exempt from taxation, they are still subject to restrictions against 
substantial lobbying or any political activity.
55
 Likewise, although religious organizations are 
free to conduct their own business internally subject to their own rules and regulations even if the 
outside world would consider the religious ways arbitrary,
56
 they are not constitutionally 
immunized against their own debts or obligations. This carries forward into the tort system, 
where religious organizations are responsible in damages to those who suffer injuries on their 
                                                          
49
 Id. See also Mark E. Chopko & Michael S. Moses, Freedom to be a Church: Confronting Challenges to the Right 
of Church Autonomy, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 387, 407-411 (2005).   
50
 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  
51
 Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490. 
52
 See Gonzales v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
53
 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (West 2000). 
54
 See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. E1564-67 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde).  
55
 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010).  
56
 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Similarly, churches are free to establish their 
own rules for financial integrity and do not necessarily need to be forced into adopting even generally accepted 
accounting standards. See Beards v. Bible Way Church, 680 A.2d 419 (D.C. 1996). 
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premises or through their activities.
57
 The unitive theme, I think, is balance between competing 
needs and concerns, which often results in line-drawing.  
 
  
A BUSINESS LIKE ANY OTHER? 
 
 For our purposes, to turn the question around, the regulation of religious institutions in 
the public arena is characterized by concern about the constitutional limits of state authority, 
while at the same time holding those religious institutions to regulatory standards when they 
affected the business of the public. The interest in applying secular rules to the external works of 
a religious community is especially strong when the activity closely approximates non-religious 
charitable work in the sector, such as in healthcare, education, or social services.
58
 There is 
generally no exception made for religious institutions or religious people which operate some 
profit-making enterprise and the courts have generally not accepted that the Religion Clause 
applies to immunize the activity. Although these cases raise important issues about the scope of 
First Amendment protections, at least until recently,
59
 they have largely been unsuccessful.  
 
 For example, in Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,
60
 the Supreme Court found that 
the Labor Department had the right to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to 
volunteer workers in a gas station and convenience store owned and operated by a religious 
entity.
61
 The substance of the case was about the entity’s bookkeeping, and, as was subsequently 
reflected in the Swaggart Ministries case,
62
 not considered significantly intrusive upon religious 
beliefs.
63
 Similarly, in United States v. Lee,
64
 an owner of a carpentry business was not allowed 
                                                          
57
 Gen. Council On Fin. & Admin. v. Sup. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.). There, then circuit Justice 
Rehnquist denied a request for a stay brought by the central governing agency of the United Methodist Church in a 
case involving civil liability for the failure of one of the church’s retirement homes in California. Id. at 1374. He 
distinguished between the need to protect the internal autonomy of religious organizations against governmental 
interference when the matter involves the internals of the community, especially its law and principles, from cases 
brought by injured third parties simply trying to enforce the same kind of obligation that would exist against any 
other agency. Id. at  1372-73. He did not presume to speak for the entire Court, and no Supreme Court case since 
then has delineated that line. 
58
 See generally William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral Choices in 
Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMPT.  HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 (2001).  
59
 The recent exceptions have occurred in the context of the HHS Mandate, where private business owners have 
challenged the mandate ( which requires that all health plans offered by private employers include contraceptive 
coverage at no cost) on the grounds that it violates their religious beliefs. Ironically, some cases brought by for-
profit businesses have yielded injunctions, while religious institutions claiming a burden on their religious rights 
have been unsuccessful in achieving the same result. Compare Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353 
(7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (granting preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of HHS Mandate against a private 
construction company) to Zubik v. Sebelius, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 5932977 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2012) 
(denying request for preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of HHS Mandate against Catholic schools 
directly affiliated with the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh). 
60
 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
61
 Id. at 306. 
62
 See 493 U.S. at 389-90. 
63
 Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303-06. 
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to avoid payment of the employer’s share of Social Security taxes on account of the fact that he 
personally was Amish and had religious beliefs that opposed such payments.
65
 The Court in that 
case found that the government has a compelling interest in the uniformity of the tax system 
against those who would resist it.
66





 The law looks Janus-like in both directions. When the U.S. Supreme Court mandated 
deference to parental rights in the choice of schools for their children, a matter that it said was 
walled off from exclusive state regulation, the Court also noted that it was beyond dispute that 
the content of the curriculum and other matters concerning how the education process would 
unfold in the school was subject to state regulation.
68
 Taken together, the case law shows both a 
concern for respecting the legitimate autonomy of religious institutions for religious expression 
and conduct from intrusive government scrutiny and the need to hold these institutions 
accountable when they act in the public square. In some endeavors therefore the issue isn’t 
“either-or”, but “both-and.” For some questions there is both an internal, personal, and religious 
aspect beyond the competence of the state to regulate, and an external, though religiously-
motivated action in the public sphere that creates consequences for which the religious actor 
could be held accountable, subjected to reasonable regulation, or even criminal sanction in 
appropriate cases.
69
 The issue invariably is whether the case presented some dispute that to 
resolve required assessment or regulation of an issue internal to the religious community (and 
thus normatively out of bounds for the civil courts), or concerned a matter of external 
relationships which could be adjudicated. 
 
 The church property litigation is a good example. In these cases, the ownership of 
congregational property is disputed by factions within the community. Each accuses the other of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
64
 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
65
 Id. at 260-61. Notably, individual Amish are exempt, by statute, from the requirement of making such payments. 
26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (West 2008). In cases involving commercial activity, the religious people who own and operate 
commercial businesses have generally been unsuccessful in resisting commercial regulation even where the 
application of the rules necessarily burdened their personal religious views. Elane Photography, LLC v. Whitlock, 
284 P.3d 428, 436, 439 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) cert. granted 2012 –N.M. Cert- 8 (N.M. Aug. 16, 2012) (rejecting 
religion and expression claims); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm., 913 P.2d 909, 919, 925 (Cal. 1996), cert. 
denied 521 U.S. 1129 (1997) (rejecting Free Exercise and RFRA claims) 
66
 Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60. In other words, tax resisters always lose.  
67
 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The fact that regulation may make a particular religious exercise or 
religiously motivated action more expensive, therefore, does not necessarily create a significant enough burden to 
create constitutional injury. 
68
 Pierce v Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). As the Court pointed out before it began its analysis,  
 No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to  
 inspect,  supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of  
 proper age attend  some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic  
 disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that  
 nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.  
 Id.  
69
 See, e.g., Gen. Council On Fin. & Admin., 439 U.S. 1369 .    
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disloyalty, heresy, and other heinous behaviors. Each claims to be the authentic voice of the 
church. But these cases also present claims on the title to property, claims for which courts are 
designed to rule, to define and describe rights and responsibilities from the division of or title to 
property between disputing parties. The law in the U.S. Supreme Court evolved in such a way 
that property dispute cases in religious institutions are handled differently than the same cases 
that arise in secular communities or social clubs. 
 
 In Watson, for hierarchical churches, the Court reasoned that civil courts should be bound 
by the decision of the highest adjudicative body and could not second-guess that determination. 
In congregational churches, governed by their members in processes that the Court understood 
were analogous to membership associations, the rule was different: majority ruled. The view of 
the Court, I believe, was in ensuring that whatever procedures followed thereafter in the civil 
courts would not upset the result reached according to the internal law of the community. The 
states themselves never followed this regime rigidly, and these disputes continued to percolate. 
In the mid-20
th
 century, the Court moved away from the binary and highly deferential Watson 
regime to permit individual states to adjudicate property questions based on the application of 





 This process culminated in 1979 in Jones v. Wolf, 
71
 where a five to four majority found 
that states, as a matter of federal constitutional law, could, under a “neutral principles” approach, 
allow their courts to scrutinize various documents to decide property questions.
72
 These 
documents would include articles of incorporation, deeds, titles documents, mortgages, trust, and 
even religious documents describing the organization of the faith community, all reviewable 
without overstepping constitutional boundaries.
73
 The proviso, of course, is that such review 
must proceed in a neutral and secular fashion.
74
 If the court finds that a question inevitably leads 
into a dispute over religious doctrine or the meaning of some religious principle, the court was 
required to defer to the decisions of the proper religious authorities (including how the 
congregation decided the matter).
75
 As they concern the rights of religious institutions, the trend 
in these cases seems to open the door to more, not less, involvement of the courts overseeing the 
internal business of religious institutions, so long as one can persuade a court that the scrutiny is 
only neutral and secular.
76
   
 
 My own view is that, notwithstanding the trend towards seeing such cases as secular 
disputes subject to neutral principles, religious institutions can plan for how these matters should 
                                                          
70
 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Md. & Va, Churches v. Sharpsburg 
Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
71
 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
72
 Id. at 604. 
73
 Id. at 602-04.  
74
 Id. at 604. Unfortunately, the Court did not explain how to review and apply denominational books in a secular 
fashion. 
75
 Id. at 604 (citing Serbian, 426 U.S. at 709).   
76
 See, e.g., Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999).  
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be subject to administrative scrutiny or judicial review and instances of dispute.
77
 For example, 
religious institutions can (and should) incorporate religious principles into secular documents 
including deeds, trusts, and corporate articles, not only to guide administrators but also to 
prescribe what should happen in case of a dispute.
78
 In a dispute arising under such documents, 
courts, following the rule in Wolf, are supposed to proceed along the path laid out in the 
documents by the religious community at the time of their adoption. Read in this light, and 
implemented in this fashion, the results under Wolf should be indistinguishable from the results 
under the Watson rule of deference.
79
 In other words, if a hierarchical church wants to direct the 
disposition of property in the event that a worshiping community wants to sever its relationship 
with the hierarchy and move in a different direction, it can provide for that contingency directly 
in the corporate articles of the congregation or by the incorporation of religious law and 
principles into those articles which, in turn, reference the reversion of property to the 
denomination in times of dispute. That is the result in the majority of cases of schism within the 
Episcopal Church.
80
 The same decisional path should accompany the construction of charitable 
trusts for religious property under the authority of the Court’s decision in Gonzales.81 When the 
matter in dispute concerns some non-member third party in a contract with the faith community 
however, those rules wouldn’t apply and Wolf would undoubtedly assure that only secular and 




 There is room therefore for “reasonable regulation” to protect the rights of the public with 
respect to the dispensation of charity, to avoid fraud, to prevent private benefit and other 
inurement, and to advance the expectations of donors. Religious institutions, after all, are led by 
sinful individuals who make mistakes, act out of petty motives, and sometimes see themselves as 
the beneficiaries of the charity. When these, thankfully rare, events happen, all religious charity 
suffers. But those who regulate must exercise care and discretion lest their cures violate 
constitutional principles. A “regulation that goes too far is a taking” warned Justice Holmes83 
and those words plainly apply in the oversight of religious charity. For example, in California in 
the 1970s, the state Attorney General appointed a receiver for the Worldwide Church of God in 
the face of allegations of financial fraud. The state receiver barred church leaders from spending 
                                                          
77
 The Supreme Court in Wolf supported this view. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 606 (“At any time before the dispute 
erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church 
property.”).  
78
 See id. 
79
 The key word here obviously is “should” but that’s a whole other paper. 
80
 See In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66 (Cal. 2009). 
81
 See generally Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1.  
82
 The inside-outside dichotomy can predict results in cases even that originate inside religious communities.  For 
example, if a person is shunned or dis-fellowed by a religious group, the courts believe it matters whether the 
impacts of the discipline are only internal to the church, Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819 
F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) cert. denied 484 U.S. 926. or intended to affect the person in the wider community. 
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106-07 (Pa. 1975).  See also Guinn v. Church of Christ of 
Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 777-78 (Okla. 1989) (drawing immunity line from tort claims related to discipline around 
members, not “former members”).  
83
 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.). The quote is: “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.” 
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the money to appeal to members for funds to hire the lawyers required to fight the state’s 
regulatory intrusions.
84
 Across the country, without exception, the religious community raised 
alarm over this unprecedented takeover of a religious body by the state. Had the California 
legislature not intervened to restrict the power of the attorney general to appoint a receiver in the 










 As noted above, in re-writing the Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Court made an 
exception for cases implicating the internal autonomy of religious institutions.
87
 For the first time 
in more than 30 years, the Supreme Court reviewed a case directly raising the right of a religious 
community to be exempt, as a matter of constitutional law, from the general regulations of the 
state, specifically the application of anti-discrimination laws to the employment practices of a 
religious community. This is a classic regulatory struggle between neutral and generally 
applicable principles of laws that govern the behavior of institutions, large and small, across the 
spectrum, including religious institutions. The lower courts had evolved a rule that immunized 
such employment decisions from judicial scrutiny when they involve the selection, supervision, 
or retention of a “minister,” construed broadly.88 The United States urged the application of the 
anti-discrimination rules as neutral and generally applicable, and therefore permissible under 
Employment Division v. Smith, and as avoiding other entanglements that might result in 
invalidity.
89
  In January, 2012, a unanimous Court distinguished Smith and held that the 
application of the employment discrimination rules to the supervision and retention of the 
minister violated the First Amendment, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause.
90
 According to the Court, “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar[red] the government from 
interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”91 The Court’s 
decision on the inapplicability of the antidiscrimination rules to ministers is likely to take years 
to sort out. While it arises in the realm of the hiring and firing of ministers, it raises some 
important guideposts for regulators and adds complexity to figuring out the dividing line 
between the permissible and the impermissible.  
                                                          
84
 See People ex rel. Deukmajian v. Worldwide Church of God, 178 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
85
 Id. at 917-18. 
86
 With apologies to George Lucas and Star Wars fans everywhere (and now Disney and *gasp* J.J. Abrams). 
87
  Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. It should also be noted that when the Court re-wrote its Establishment Clause test and 
opened the way towards a more neutral assessment of the participation in public programs, it preserved the ability of 
a religious body to use the “excessive entanglement” prong as a vehicle to resist governmental intrusions. See 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. at 232-35.  
88
 See Alicia-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); McClure v. Salvation Army, 
460 F.2d 553, 559–60 (5th Cir. 1972). 
89
 See discussion of briefing in Mark Chopko and Marissa Parker, “Still a Threshold Question: Refining the 
Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 First Amdt L. Rev. 233, 242-43, 302 (2012). 
90
 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
91




 The Court broadly endorses the rights of religious institutions to order their own 
workplaces according to religious principle. Nonetheless, this holding will be tested repeatedly. 
For example, the Court only adopts the exemption rule for claims stated by “ministers” and (so 
far) only arising under the antidiscrimination laws; it gives no definition of “minister” and 
reserves for another day whether the same sorts of principles ought to guide adjudication of cases 
that sound in contract or tort when they arise in minister employment.
92
 It is not clear, for 
example, where such claims like equal pay or other equality-based statutes will fall or even state 
regulation designed to achieve broader social goals about equality.
93
    
 
 Vindicating religious autonomy norms in ministry employment cases, however, means 
re-examining the limits placed on religious institutions by the norms offered in Smith for Free 
Exercise cases (“neutral and generally applicable”) and in Wolf for Establishment Clause cases 
(“neutral principles”). Does the exercise of public religious activity (“ministry?”), such as in 
healthcare or education, now implicate protections broadly endorsed in Hosanna-Tabor? The 
majorities in both Smith and Wolf anticipated that neutrality would cede whenever the resolution 
of the case requires the derogation of some religious principle.
94
 The Hosanna-Tabor Court 
distinguished Smith in a most superficial way. It found that Smith only involved government 
regulation of “outward physical acts,” but that the application of the anti-discrimination norms 
dealt with “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”95  
 
 Both the conduct of the individuals in Smith and the conduct of the school in Hosanna-
Tabor were motivated by sincere religious principles. They both had external consequences in 
the areas where the state had a legitimate concern. Teasing out where this line will be in future 
regulatory clashes between religious organizations and the government may prove a very 
unsatisfactory way of resolving this question. The line to be tested and likely in some other area 
of government regulation and oversight is whether Hosanna-Tabor signals some shift away from 







                                                          
92
 Id. at 710. 
93
 For example, there is a line of cases that rejects the constitutional arguments of religious employers to pay women 
less than men based on an interpretation of Scripture defining man as the head of the household and therefore the 
breadwinner, and therefore entitled to higher pay.  Dole v Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 
1990). Are these claims barred? Only when made by ministers? No matter who raises them? 
94
 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at  886–87 (discussing inappropriateness of courts attempting to judge whether 
certain religious beliefs or practices are “central” to a religion); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (“[T]he First 
Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and 
practice.”). 
95
 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707.  
96
 A particularly interesting question will be how religious charities who choose to provide services only to 
individuals of a certain religion or who adhere to certain religious values are treated under the law. See Esbeck, 
supra note 35 at 411 (discussing the treatment of religious adoption agencies that only placed children with families 





 Against this background, what rules would one apply in assessing the legitimacy or scope 
of government regulation of religious entities?  Here are what I think are the applicable 
guideposts: 
 
 (1)  Internal workings of the religious body even when they implicate external issues, 
such as in the administration of property, can be beyond the authority of the state to regulate. 
Certainly, if the question at the heart of the disputed or regulated matter concerns internal 
religious issues, such as the qualifications for membership or church office, the discipline of 
members, and the setting and application of internal rules, the state is presumptively incompetent 
to play a role even when those members affected by such decisions seek resort to the courts or 
the Attorney General on such matters.
97
 The law summarized above largely insulates the 
religious entity from this kind of regulation. 
 
 (2) Under the evolving Religion Clause regime, when a religious body is acting with 
respect to the general public, that is to say “externally,” neutral, secular, and generally applicable 
state regulation is more likely to trump religious objections regardless of how the objections are 
framed. Because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
98
 only applies to the federal 
government
99
 and not to the states,
100
 adjudication of these questions will proceed under these 
evolving equality norms. The religious entity will have to show why the incursion of these rules 
necessarily implicates a religious norm such that the state effectively is precluding the religious 
entity from exercising its religion or the resolution of the dispute necessarily entangles the state 
inside the religious function. 
 
 (3) The point of the spear is when the oversight or adjudication of some external religious 
action necessarily involves an internal religious norm. Under current law, a court (or regulator) 
would be balancing the considerations to see whether both might be accommodated or that the 
resulting decision respects the legitimate interests of both institutions. Hosanna-Tabor is the 
exception here, where the termination of an employee was allowed to proceed notwithstanding 
the actions of the religious employer (allegedly) violating the state’s non-discrimination norms. 
 
 (4) Although the government is allowed to condition participation in public programs 
which results in the payment of public money,
101
 the law of unconstitutional conditions may yet 
                                                          
97
 The case of the Our Lady of  the Angels Hospital is a case in point.  The incorporators provided that disputes 
about the scope of authority should be decided by the sitting Archbishop of Los Angeles. They did not contemplate 
that their first serious dispute would be with him.  The state declined to intervene and set aside the internal process 
agreed to in the formation of the hospital. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1977).  
98
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (West 1993). 
99
 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
100
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
101
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
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 As one moves forward to consider what the future of regulatory oversight might bring, 
these issues (and possibly many others) might be significant. Some are applications of existing 
law; others are demographic.   
 
 (1) With the King’s coin comes the King. The expectation is that if a religious 
institution receives government funds, it does not have the right to adapt or rewrite the program 
to its religious views. Recently this rule was confirmed in a district court ruling that the contract 
between the Department of Health and Human Services and the US Catholic Bishops for human 
resources programs combating trafficking could not allow the bishops to exclude family planning 




 (2) The neutral principles regime. Because the burden of proof now remains with the 
religious adherent to show that the government acted in a discriminatory fashion (in order to 
trigger a compelling interest analysis) or in an irrational fashion, litigation over exemptions has 
much higher stakes for religious institutions after Smith. In a sense, government agencies are 
rewarded for acting as broadly as possible and not making exceptions for anyone. That is, in a 
neutral and generally applicable fashion. They no longer need to justify separate or severable 




 (3) Scandal, fraud, and other misconduct. Religious institutions led by fallible humans 
can plainly be responsible for the perpetration of terrible wrongs. The persistence of such 
wrongdoing, even if it is isolated and sporadic, in turn creates pressure for accountability at all 
levels. When individual members of religious bodies try to seek such accountability from their 
institutions they may be turned away.
105
 That places pressure on state agencies to act on reports 
                                                          
102
 Sherbert v Verner criticized South Carolina authorities for conditioning the availability of unemployment benefits 
on the applicant’s forbearance of a cardinal principle of her religion. 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963). This area of the 
law, however, is admittedly murky. 
103
 A.C.L.U. v. Sebelius, 821 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482-88 (D. Mass 2012), vacated as moot, --- F.3d ---- (1
st
 Cir 2013.).  
104
 Another point here is the potentially tenuous relationship between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause. Providing too much special treatment to a religious entity in order to follow the Free Exercise 
Clause could in turn violate the Establishment Clause. Catherine M. Knight, Must God Regulate Religious 
Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation Provisions of the Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L. J. 721, 733 (1993).  
105
 See Levitt v. Calvary Temple of Denver, 33 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2001). Under Colorado law, the member of a 
nonprofit corporation has rights including to see the books and for other accountability of the leadership. See id. at 
1229 (citing COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-136-102 (West 2003)). In Levitt, A church member successfully enlisted the 
trial courts to pursue financial accounting of his church. Id. at 1228. The church leaders dis-fellowed him, and the 
Colorado appellate courts held that the question of membership entitlement was a religious question and one which 
was insulated from judicial review. Id. at 1229-30. 
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of financial irregularities. I expect that drawing the line between permissive and impermissible 




 (4) The rise of the “Nones.” Recently, demographers have documented that those 
citizens who claim to have no religious affiliation exceed 20%, and that number is growing.
107
 
Even as far back as 2008, the number of religiously unaffiliated  in the United States was over 
triple the number of all non-Christian religions combined.
108
 If this trend continues, there will be 
new pressures on state regulators to justify any special treatment given to religious institutions. 
Those institutions will become less relevant as the unaffiliated continue to view them as an 
unnecessary part of religion.
109
 Those institutions that do good works in society will be expected 
to be subject to the same sorts of rules and regulations that follow other organizations that seek 
to do good in the community. This places renewed pressure on religious institutions as well. No 
longer is it obvious why certain regulations should not apply to religious institutions. Those 
institutions must make the case for regulatory exemptions and explain why state regulation 
would intrude on some other important principle. Because the Court in Smith indicated that the 
place to work out exemptions was in the legislatures and not in the courts,
110
 success in the 
political process will depend on whether the religious “case” is persuasive.  See challenge (2) 
above. 
 
 (5) Protecting the rights of non-conformists. In the state contraceptive mandate 
litigation, the New York Court of Appeals expressed concern that, if the government did not 
intervene on behalf of a nonconforming employee, the employee could be subject to adverse 
treatment by the religious employer for exercising a right or a privilege available under the law 
over the religious employer’s objections.111 In other words, the court thought that intervening in 
the employment relationship to assure the ability of an employee to resist a religious condition of 
her religious employer was an entirely legitimate role for government. By contrast, the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the opposite view in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. 
                                                          
106
 However, self-regulation and religious institutions’ own push for their own accountability could help lead to 
more freedom from government regulation. In fact some groups are setting forth recommendations along these lines. 
See, e.g. Commission on Accountability & Policy for Religious Organizations, Enhancing Accountability for the 
Religious and Broader Nonprofit Sector (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.ecfa.org/PDF/Commission-Report-
December-2012.pdf.   
107
 See generally Pew Research Center, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, “Nones” on the Rise: One-in-
Five Adults Have No Religious Affiliation (Oct. 9, 2012), available at  
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Unaffiliated/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf. 
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 See Pew Research Center, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religion Landscape Survey – 
Religious Affiliation: Diverse and Dynamic 5 (Feb. 2008) available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-
religious-landscape-study-full.pdf. 
109
 However, as Washington Post faith columnist Lisa Miller points out, “to be unaffiliated with any faith group is 
not the same as being deaf to a moral argument, or even a theological one.” Lisa Miller, The Religious Left Needs 
Strong Moral Issues, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/the-religious-left-needs-strong-moral-issues/2013/01/11/d9523c82-5c2a-
11e2-88d0-c4cf65c3ad15_story.html. This may suggest that some “Nones” would be willing to return to religious 
institutions if those institutions are able to demonstrate the value of their work. 
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 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).  
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 in which it upheld a broad religious employer definition in an exemption from Title 
VII.
113
 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan recognized that in the process of vindicating religious 
institutional rights, individual employee preferences might be harmed.
114
 Casting the rule in 
favor of the employee over her religious employer, Justice Brennan explained, could chill the 
legitimate exercise of protected constitutional interests.
115





 Dean Cafardi observes that Americans express their displeasure through litigation.
116
 We 
must be very unhappy. Traditionally, the general rule was that if a person was dissatisfied with 
the course of conduct of a particular house of worship or religious denomination, that person was 
always free to leave and follow some other path. The individual did not have the right to force 
the religious body to conform to his or her desires. I believe that still to be the law in United 
States, although the persistence of litigation brought by those who are dissatisfied with the 
course and direction of their own houses of worship and religious communities says otherwise. 
Those who bring these claims believe powerfully in the ability of the government to shape the 
course and direction of religious bodies. In the 19
th
 century, state legislatures adopted neutral and 
generally applicable rules for religious corporations. They provided that no cleric could sit on a 
board of directors and that the governance of the real property and oversight of the finances 
could only rest in the hands of lay trustees.
117
 The real purpose of these laws was to democratize 
the Catholic Church, but to my knowledge no court declared these legislative attempts to be 
unconstitutional under state law.
118
 The persistence of this litigation encourages others to take 
such actions to modernize, regularize or even homogenize the way in which religious bodies 
conduct themselves in their operations according to some generally applicable secular norms.  
Certainly there will be more, not less pressure on regulators to take action against religious 
bodies or otherwise hold them accountable under secular, neutral and generally applicable 
norms. 
 
 More alarming from the perspective of religious institutions is the recent effort to define 
away the scope of constitutional protections.  That was the import of the government’s litigation 
position in Hosanna-Tabor that the policing of the decision to terminate a minister did not state 
claims under the Religion Clause, a position rejected by a unanimous Court. But on the horizon 
the next issue looms. 
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 Much of the future development of doctrine will depend on the scope of the concepts of 
“ministry” and where the Court eventually demarcates “internal” from “external”, to apply 
Hosanna-Tabor or Smith. Pressing the limits of religious exemptions or, conversely, expanding 
the limits of permissible government action will be the ultimate decision on the constitutionality 
of the narrowed definition of exempt “religious employer” currently found within state and 
federal contraceptive mandates. The asserted purpose of the narrowed definition is to exempt 
only those religious actors that are truly and authentically religious from those who are only 
acting out of religious motivation (according to the State, not the Church).
119
 Effectively, this 
definition allows the government to classify among admittedly religious entities according to 
how religious the government thinks they are.  
 
 Whether such a definition withstands constitutional scrutiny may depend on the 
continued vitality of the line of cases involving excessive entanglement by the government in 
drawing and enforcing those lines,
120
 an expansion of the concerns expressed by the Court in the 
ministerial exception case with respect to the internal order and operations of the religious 
actor,
121
 or some other constitutional norm such as expressive association.
122
 Regardless of 
whether one believes this definition is singular and immaterial to other forms of regulation, if 
upheld, this definition could become the benchmark to describe the boundary between 
government regulation and exemption. The pressure on religious bodies that adhere to norms of 
behavior and expectations of conduct that are “heretical” when measured by contemporary social 
norms will be enormous.  It is not too much to suggest that such a rule would corrode the barriers 
between religion and government in ways that would remake the society.  
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